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GLOBAL CREDIT CRISIS AND REGULATORY REFORM.​[1]​ 		G A WALKER

The recent crises in financial markets have caused significant damage and hardship especially with the onslaught of the global recession beginning in October and November 2008. This never developed into a full Depression while the downturn appeared to level during the second quarter of 2009 and with financial markets beginning to recover before the rest of the economy. A number of lessons must now be learned with regard to supervisory and regulatory revision as well as in terms of more general monetary and economic policy management of the modern complex economies.

The global financial crisis has unfolded with a brutal and remorseless continuity and predictability. We have now moved through three clear phases of turmoil from an initial credit contraction in August 2007 to successive  bank and  financial failures and bail-outs in the summer of 2008 and then to a full stock market crisis and consequent global recession in Autumn 2008. 

We are now in the third stage of the most tumultuous period in financial history since the stock market crash in 1929 and consequent Great Depression. If the five days between Monday 15 September and Friday 19 September 2008 were not unsettling enough, the global financial system teetered on the edge of collapse three weeks later between Monday 6 and 10 October 2008. US markets had stabilised little following the protracted and untidy agreement on 3 October on the US$700bn bail-out plan while European leaders singularly failed to agree any common collective response. The British Government was then forced into undertaking an inspired but uncharacteristically dramatic lead (especially following Northern Rock) in adopting the first informed and comprehensive package of response measures to the crisis on 8 October. 





The turmoil originated with the credit tightening on inter-bank markets beginning 9 August 2007. Inter-bank credits froze after BNP Paribas suspended payments on three investment funds. The German Sachsen Landesbank was sold to the Landesbank Baden-Wuerttenberg on 28 August 2007 with IKB losing US$1bn in US sub-prime debt. Shares in Northern Rock fell on 14 and 15 September 2007 following the announcement of its request for liquidity assistance from the Bank of England with Northern Rock eventually being brought into public ownership (nationalised) on 17 February 2008 after the Treasury’s rejection of the remaining private sector bids. 





The credit crisis spread to other financial sectors at the end of summer 2008 with a number of major non-bank financial institutions announcing further losses. The original pressure in the credit markets then infected other parts of the financial system with the most infamous casualties being the giant US mortgage lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the remaining major independent Wall Street investment firms, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, the largest global insurance company, American Insurance International (AIG), and other US commercial banks including Wachovia and Washington Mutual (WaMu).

(1)	Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac









With the crisis at Lehman, Merrill Lynch was forced to accept a $50bn offer by Bank of America after a week of negotiations with the deal being announced on the same day as the Lehman bankruptcy. Shares in the remaining two largest US independent investment banks, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, continued to fall on Thursday 18 September. Morgan Stanley approached the Wachovia Bank in the US and the China Investment Corporation (CIC) for capital support but with concerns arising with regard to the political sensitivity of allowing the CIC to acquire a major stake in a Wall Street firm. Wachovia was later acquired by J P Morgan. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley would subsequently be forced to reregister as bank holding companies ending the inglorious days of large scale aggressive independent investment banking on Wall Street.

(4)	American International Group (AIG)





Considerable market pressure had also been placed on Washington Mutual (WaMu) although it was decided to allow WaMu to close at the end of September 2008. This was the largest individual US bank failure. WaMu had assets of US$307bn and deposits of US$188bn at the end of June 2008 with US$46.6bn in equity and bonds outstanding. WaMu was closed down by the FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) on the evening of Thursday 25 September 2008 with J P Morgan acquiring its deposit and retail branch business and mortgage portfolio but without any unsecured debt or liabilities of the holding company. J P Morgan became the largest banking group in the US. The effect of the closure was again to wipe-out the shareholders and bondholders in WaMu with another bank being allowed to come and purchase the assets following the closure at a substantial discount rather than support the failing entity. Thirteen other lenders were allowed to close during 2008 although WaMu was by far the largest.

3.	UK STOCK MARKET COLLAPSE AND BAIL-OUT





The first major casualty from the global credit tightening in the UK was Northern Rock which was forced to ask for liquidity support from the Bank of England on 14 September 2007. This was perfectly appropriate as the bank was solvent, the open facility was fully collateralised and a generous (but undisclosed) rate of interest was charged. The Bank was then consistent in refusing to inject liquidity into the markets more generally (for moral hazard reasons) but still support a fully solvent and profitable individual bank subsequently.

The later withdrawal of funds from Northern Rock beginning on 15 and 16 September then created a classic ‘bank run’. The institution was solvent and fully backed by the Bank of England under its emergency facility (which it did not use to cover any of the early deposit withdrawal demands). Despite this, many depositors felt compelled to withdraw their funds. Individual loss could have resulted where a claim was for more than the permitted amount under the UK bank deposit protection scheme (now managed on an integrated basis with securities and insurance payments under the Financial Services Compensation Scheme although with separate sub-funds). This provided for payment of 100% on the first £2,000 in each deposit account and 90% of the next £33,000 on each account. This was later increased in October 2008 to provide £50,000 minimum cover with a possible further rise subsequently following consultation.​[2]​  There was also an argument that this would have involved unnecessary delay and inconvenience with funds not being immediately available. All of this would, however, only have been relevant if the bank had collapsed which it could not with the Bank facility in place.

Northern Rock’s own business model which relied substantially on wholesale funding also meant that deposit withdrawals were not a major problem. These only represented 28% of its funding which could easily have been raised elsewhere before the crisis. The difficulty was that this model is dependent on a continuous flow of funds through the inter-bank and wholesale markets. Northern Rock was then largely punished for its own efficient use of the markets although this does raise significant concerns with regard to liquidity cover and gearing ratios which will now be re-considered. 

The FSA was severely criticised for its supervision of Northern Rock and published a summary of the review conducted by its internal audit division into the supervision of Northern Rock on 26 March 2008.  The internal audit review confirmed four main failings in connection with Northern Rock. There had been a lack of sufficient supervisory engagement with the firm with the supervisory team not following up rigorously enough with management on the business model vulnerability arising through changing market conditions. There had been a lack of adequate oversight and review by FSA line management on the quality, intensity and rigour of the firm’s supervision. There had been inadequate specific resource directly supervising the firm and a lack of intensity by the FSA ensuring that all available risk information was properly utilised to inform its supervisory actions. The FSA Board nevertheless confirmed its support for the philosophy of outcomes focused and principles based regulation with financial firms being primarily responsible for ensuring their own financial soundness. The Board accepted the regulatory failings identified although it noted that even if Northern Rock had been supervised to a higher standard, its funding difficulties and subsequent public acquisition would not necessarily have been avoided.

The Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 was specifically enacted on a short Parliamentary procedure to allow the Northern Rock to be brought into temporary public ownership in February 2008.​[3]​ This also assisted with the reconstruction of the Bradford & Bingley (B&B) in September 2008 and action taken in connection with the UK subsidiaries of the Heritable and Kaupthing Singer and Friedlander in October 2008.​[4]​ 

(2)	Bradford & Bingley (B&B)

After the events at Northern Rock, the UK debate concerning the most appropriate way of dealing with banks and other financial institutions in difficulty shifted to B&B. The FSA and Treasury had attempted to find a large well capitalised banking group that could acquire B&B’s business as a whole but with the market declining interest, the Treasury had then to consider whether to take B&B into public ownership either in whole or part over the weekend of 27/28 September 2008. The decision was eventually taken to nationalise the mortgage and loan business worth £43.3bn under the Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 enacted following Northern Rock but to sell the £22bn of retail deposits and 200 branch business to Spanish Banco Santander. Santander had already acquired the Abbey and Alliance & Leicester. B&B was perceived as vulnerable as it had the highest growing level of mortgage defaults especially on self-certification and buy-to-let policies.

The economic justification for the deal was nevertheless questionable with the Government effectively having to pay Banco Santander £20bn to manage the deposit and branch business at the same time as acquire £52bn in bad assets including £41bn of mortgages up to 85% of which could default. A simpler option may have been to put B&B into administration with a guarantee that all deposits would be repaid. The effect of the nationalisation of the mortgage book was to increase the Government’s holding of ‘bad debts’ to over £125bn following the nationalisation of Northern Rock. The UK had effectively created a ‘bad bank’ option in parallel with US and other models. 

(3)	Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS)





A bitter dispute separately arose between the authorities in the UK and Iceland following the nationalisation of the country’s largest banks and the freezing of their accounts. The Icelandic Government purchased 75% of Glitnir on Monday 6 October and Landsbanki was put into receivership on Tuesday 7 October. New laws had been brought into effect to allow the acquisitions. A diplomatic conflict arose after the UK Government’s decision to place Kaupthing’s UK operations in administration on Wednesday 8 October 2008. Kaupthing had already sold its Edged deposit business to ING in the Netherlands. The Treasury had used anti-terrorist laws to freeze the assets worth an estimated £400bn against £300bn in deposits held by UK account holders in Icelandic banks. UK local authorities had over £800m deposited with substantial losses also possibly being suffered by major UK charities.

Similar difficulties also arose at the Belgo/Dutch/Luxembourg Fortis group which was broken up and the Dutch part nationalised. Franco-Belgian Dexia had to be refinanced. The original attempt to save the German Hypo Real Estate failed after a consortium of state and bank support withdrew with further funding being required. Similar problems arose in Italy, Greece and other European countries with many of the former Soviet bloc countries also experiencing continuing difficulties as the crisis unfolded.

(5)	UK Rescue Plan and Recapitalisation

As markets continued to fall and with the leak of a possible UK rescue plan during the week beginning 6th October, the Government was placed under increasing pressure to bring forward any more substantial response package. Stock markets fell by their largest amounts since ‘Black Monday’ in October 1987 with the FTSE 100 index dropping 7.9% and the Dow Jones Industrial Average falling 7.75%. Following overnight discussions between the Treasury and the major banks with the Bank of England and the FSA, the Chancellor announced a refinancing package at 7.30am on Wednesday 8 October 2008. While the Treasury blamed the banks for leaking the plan and forcing the Chancellor to act earlier than intended, the banks criticised the Government for the continued delay. RBS, in particular, blamed the Treasury for the further unnecessary falls in its share price.

The final Treasury refinancing plan involved the making available of up to £50bn to the eight largest UK banks in exchange for preference shares. The Bank of England’s Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS) was doubled from £100bn to £200bn - with Treasury bills being exchangeable for less quality liquid collateral assets (although with strict discounts being maintained). The Treasury also provided commercial guarantees worth up to £250bn on new wholesale funding for up to three years. The objective of the guarantees was to allow banks to raise further medium-term funds on the money markets as existing facilities matured. 

The UK Government had created the first coherent reform package to the crisis - although this was still on strict commercial terms. This was no ‘giveaway’ as portrayed in parts of the press - with the strict terms imposed not allowing any immediate improvement in money market lending. The UK package was further strengthened, at least, indirectly by the announcement by central banks in six major countries (including China for the first time) that interest rates would be cut by 0.5% on Thursday 9 October 2008 with the Bank of England later being forced to reduce rates to 3% in November and with further reductions expected.

The Government confirmed on the morning of Monday 13 October 2008 that £37bn would be invested in RBS (£90bn), HBOS (£12bn) and Lloyds TSB (£5bn) with Barclays attempting to raise £7bn directly from the capital markets. While the banks had supported the initial announcement of capital support, they were taken by surprise by the need to confirm the amount that each would require within five days before the markets opened on the following Monday morning. Markets had remained nervous and there were concerns that further instability would follow with the most effective results being achieved through a quick confirmation of the amounts to be committed. While the banks were considering how much they could raise through private issues, the FSA had forced them to recalculate their capital requirements on the basis of a severe recession at the same time as continue to provide credit to the economy. It was reported that the FSA had pressed the banks to raise their tier 1 capital ratios to a wholly unnecessary 9%. The effect of this was to raise the capital figures produced far in excess of that which may otherwise have been reasonably required to stabilise the system at the time. 

As many of the banks had also already issued large amounts of preference shares (with higher dividends but no voting rights), it was confirmed that the Government would purchase a larger amount of ordinary shares in each institution. The effect of this was that the Government would acquire a controlling interest in, at least, RBS and HBOS while the holdings of existing institutional investors would be further diluted which would act as a further disincentive to any private uptake. It was also clear that existing investors would be unable to absorb the large rights issues announced across the four banks, within a short period. The Government separately confirmed that it would prohibit cash bonuses and that dividend payments would be frozen for five years although these conditions had to be relaxed subsequently. The Chief Executives and Chairmen of RBS and HBOS confirmed their resignations. The effect of the initial Lloyd’s acquisition of HBOS and later recapitalisation of HBOS and RBS in political terms was to tie in the major Scottish banking groups into the UK financial system which could be perceived as being intended, in part, to undermine the Scottish National Party’s (SNP) position and specifically support the Glenrothes by-election which labour won.      

RBS would be forced to enter into a further more comprehensive bail-out arrangement on 26 February 2009 with the UK Treasury. RBS announced losses of £24.1bn for 2008 with a £2.5bn restructuring plan and 20,000 job losses to follow. The Government agreed to inject £25.5m in new capital with £325bn in distressed assets being supported by the Treasury guarantee in return for a fee £6.5bn. RBS would accept a first loss of £19.5bn. Stephen Hester announced plans to divide its operations into two entities with three-quarters of the successful parts of the business being retained and a quarter prepared for disposal. 

The UK bail-out plan was supported by the G7 at their meeting on the weekend of 11-12h October. Commentators had been nervous about the degree of commitment that would be displayed and then acted on. The G7 leaders nevertheless confirmed that they would use all available tools to support systemically important financial institutions and prevent their failure which was interpreted as meaning that there would be no more Lehman-style collapses. The G7 further confirmed that they would take all necessary steps to unfreeze credit and money markets and ensure that banks and other financial institutions had broad access to liquidity and funding. They would ensure that banks and other major financial intermediaries could raise capital from public as well as private sources in sufficient amounts to re-establish confidence. 

The UK refinancing plan was subsequently approved and implemented with various national revisions at EU level during the week beginning Monday 13 October 2008. Germany established a Є100bn fund to support banks with a total package of Є300-400bn including inter-bank guarantees and direct loans. Portugal confirmed that it would provide a credit line of up to Є20bn to guarantee bank liquidity. Similar plans were announced in other countries across the world. 





A number of initiatives were taken forward in the US, UK and other countries as well at the EU and international levels in response to the crisis. Many of these were initially only reactionary or isolated and fundamentally protectionist in effect, if not, in immediate intent. National Governments had to face the reality of the global financial contagion that had erupted and the inevitable inadequacy of any solely national based solution. The need for coordinated action nevertheless only became apparent slowly which revealed the continuing inadequacies of the post-War international financial architecture. The need for a more carefully coordinated and structured collective response was recognised although immediately postponed to a series of more general ‘new Bretton Woods’ conference meetings to begin in Washington in October 2008 and London in April 2009. 





Following the rescue plan announced for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the AIG support programme, the Federal Reserve injected US$180bn in global liquidity. The funds were made available through the Fed and other national central banks including the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank as well as in Switzerland and Canada. Dollar funds were provided through central bank currency exchange and swap arrangements. This represents possibly the most significant extension of global lender of last resort funding in history intended to maintain dollar liquidity within the markets.







The most significant US initiative was Hank Paulson’s plan to establish a US$700bn mortgage rescue plan to purchase distressed debt from leading US financial institutions. The possibility of such a scheme had been raised at the end of the week of Friday 19 September and then confirmed by Paulson on the following Sunday 21 September. Under the Troubled Asset Recovery Programme (TARP), a new corporation would be established to purchase distressed (toxic) residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities from any major institution operating in the US including foreign banks. The range of securities to be covered could be extended at Treasury and Federal Reserve discretion with the assets acquired being managed by privately appointed fund managers acting on behalf of the Treasury. Securities would be purchased over the first two years and then held and disposed of over a further period to be determined. This was similar to the scheme set up during the Great Depression in the 1930s and the savings and loan crisis in 1980s and in Sweden  in the 1990s. A private sector ‘superSIV’ had also been attempted in the US more recently but also abandoned. 









Geithner subsequently clarified the US$2tn (£1.38tn) package of measures to support the US banking system. Geithner referred to this as being ‘comprehensive and forceful’ and would ‘clean up and strengthen the nation’s banks, bring in private capital to restart lending’ and ‘go around the banking system directly to the markets that consumers and businesses depend on’. Shares nevertheless fell with the absence of detail provided especially with regard to the distressed asset component and the absence of any insurance guarantee support for other portfolio assets affected by the recession. The plan consisted on an unspecified capital injection, credit market support of up to US$200bn-US$1tn, asset purchases up to US$1tn and US$50bn in foreclosure relief. Specific conditions were imposed with regard to dividend payments (other than a nominal US$0.01 per share), buying bank stock requiring sound rivals until the government assistance had been repaid in full. The most important element of the new bail-out plan was the stress testing to confirm which banks are solvent and which are not.

The results of the US stress testing of the 19 largest banks in the country were released on 7 May 2009. The carrying out of the tests had been announced in February with a series of assumptions being made with regard to the possible extent of the economic downturn. Tangible common equity (TCE) is being used in preference to the Basel Committee’s risk weight system to avoid possible further dilution. Separate initiatives have been announced by Geithner to stimulate other credit markets with only one-third of funding being provided by banks in the US.​[6]​ The release of the stress test results was important in terms of market and public interest and consumption although the figures were predictable and it has to be expected that the US authorities would not have proceeded with the exercise if they were not confident about the outcome.   





Bernard Madoff was discovered to have been running the largest ‘Ponzi’ (pyramid) selling scheme through his New York investment management firm without ZSEC detection. Madoff had received US$65bn from 5,000 clients with liquidators only being able to recover US$1bn. Madoff subsequently pled guilty to 11 charges of securities and mail fraud and money laundering and perjury on 12 March 2009. Madoff was to be sentenced with 150 years in jail although litigation was expected to last for years as investors attempt to recover some money from other financial institutions dealing with Madoff.









The Tripartite authorities have issued a number of papers in response to the UK and global crises.​[7]​ The Tripartite authorities are made up of the Bank of England, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and HM Treasury as the Tripartite authorities under the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) entered into between them in 1998 and updated in 2006. An initial discussion paper on Banking Reform: Protecting Depositors was issued in October 2007 which reviewed the current systems in place for dealing with banks in distress including the deposit protection scheme managed by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS). Five objectives were stated to support the Government’s key purpose of maintaining financial stability. Consumers had to be confident that an appropriate, credible and reliable guarantee scheme operated in a timely fashion. There had to be full transparency (including funding) in the event of a disruption in banking services. Critical banking functions must be maintained for retail, business and wholesale customers allowing where necessary an orderly transition to an alternative banking provider. Any reform must maintain the UK’s reputation as the pre-eminent location for financial services and must protect the taxpayers’ interest and ensure an appropriate sharing of costs between all parties concerning.

The Tripartite authorities had issued a separate statement on a revised financing structure for Northern Rock on 21 January 2008​[8]​ with three further consultation documents on Financial Stability and Depositor Protection being issued by HM Treasury, the FSA and the Bank of England on 1 July 2008.​[9]​ 

In the July 2008 paper on Financial Stability and Depositor Protection, the authorities reconfirmed their adherence to the five key policy objectives set out in the earlier January consultation document. A number of specific recommendations were developed with regard to stability and resilience in the financial system, individual bank difficulty, impact failure (including the new SRR), compensation and the role and function of the Bank of England including inter-agency co-ordination. The paper confirmed that the UK would implement all of the recommendations in the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) report on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience (April 2008). 

The FSA had separately strengthened individual bank oversight through its supervisory enhancement programme (SEP) and has consulted on changes to the Disclosure and Transparency Rules to clarify circumstances in which a corporate issuer in receipt of liquidity support from a central bank can have a legitimate interest to delay disclosure. The FSA has consulted on compensation limits that apply across all sectors, with bank deposit limits being increased to £50,000 on Friday 3 October 2008. 

The Bank of England will be given express statutory responsibility for contributing to the maintenance of financial stability and a new Financial Stability Committee has been created to report to the Governor and Court. The number of Court members will be restricted to 12 and all new appointments made on an advertised and open competitive basis. The Bank’s role in connection with financial stability has unfortunately only been expressed in loose and non-specific terms in the Banking Bill introduced to the House of Commons in October 2008. This is an unfortunate omission and lost opportunity. 
	
(2)	Special Resolution Regime 

The new Special Resolution Regime (SRR) was referred to in the July paper and separate consultation document released at the same time. The stated purpose was to assist the resolution of banks in difficulty. It was accepted that a range of powers were already available including through voluntary firm and regulatory action although the SRR may be required in specific cases. The SRR was described in terms of a set of existing and new tools to permit the authorities to take control of a bank that is judged to be failing - and with all other options having been deemed to be insufficient. Relevant tools included transferring part or all of the failing bank to a private sector third party or a publicly controlled ‘bridge bank’, a new special bank insolvency procedure (BIP) and updated bank administration procedure (BAP), temporary public ownership and financial support, as currently provided by the Bank of England. The most controversial element was possibly the decision to make the Bank of England responsible for determining which SRR option will be used with the FSA deciding when the regime will be triggered following a bank’s failure to comply with its threshold conditions. The FSA should clearly remain responsible for day-to-day management of any restructuring although the Bank of England may have insisted that it was involved in the original option selection This is nevertheless an unfortunately untidy compromise. The specific issues that arise with regard to maintaining financial stability on a cross-border and global basis were considered in a further Treasury paper in September 2008.​[10]​ 

The Banking (Special Provisions) Bill was introduced to the House of Commons within two days of the acquisition announcement of Northern Rock on 19 February 2008 and had received Royal Asset by 21 February 2008. The purpose was to create an interim regime to allow the Treasury to make a transfer order of the securities issued by an authorised deposit-taking institution or a building society or the property, rights and liabilities of such an institution. These provisions were then replaced by the permanent measures set out in the Banking Act 2009 following the Bills introduced to the House of Commons on 6 October 2008 (Bill 147). 

The SRR consists of three stabilisation options (with transfer to a private sector purchaser (s11), a bridge bank (s12) and temporary public ownership (s13)) as well as a bank insolvency procedure (Part 2) and a revised bank administration procedure (Part 3). The stabilisation options are exercised through the stabilisation powers including share transfer powers (ss15, 16, 26-31 and 85) and property transfer powers (ss33 and 42-46). The Act contains five new special resolution objectives (s4) with the issuance of a code of practice provided for (under s5). Specific duties and powers are conferred on the Bank of England, FSA and the Treasury under the Act. The Act also contains measures intended to improve the operation of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS), consumer protection and a strengthening of the Bank of England including through the establishment of a new Financial Committee within its Court. 






The FSA published a review by its new Chairman Lord Adair Turner on the Global Banking Crisis with a supporting discussion paper 02/2.​[11]​ The Review considers the causes of the crisis (‘What went wrong?’ in chapter 1) and proposed reforms ‘What to do?’ in chapter 2) with certain further additional issues (‘Open questions’ in chapter 3) and implementation and transition (chapter 4). The principal causes of the crisis are identified in terms of macroeconomic imbalance, financial innovation without supporting social value and deficiency in key capital and liquidity controls, which factors were aggravated by an excessive reliance on rational and self-correcting markets. The principal recommendation is that a more general systemic (macro-prudential) approach should be adopted with regard to financial regulation in place of an earlier policy of firm-specific supervision and control. Thirty two further more specific recommendations were made with regard to strengthening capital adequacy, accounting and liquidity (1-7), institutional and geographic regulatory coverage (8-10), deposit insurance (11-12), UK bank resolution (13), credit rating agencies (14-16), remuneration (17), credit default swaps and market infrastructure (18), macro-prudential analysis (19-20), FSA supervisory approach (21-22), firm risk management and governance and the Walker Review (23), the separation of utility and investment banking (24), global cross-border banking (25-26), European cross-border banking (27-28) and open questions (29-32). 

The Review generally rehearses and restates other regulatory initiatives already identified or commenced either within the UK or elsewhere. It nevertheless provides a substantive discussion of the key issues involved either in the report directly or supporting discussion papers. This then provides the intellectual basis for a new post-crisis ‘regulatory debate’ with the announcement of several further important new initiatives.

The FSA has issued a separate draft code of practice on remuneration policies.​[12]​ While boards and shareholders were to set remuneration levels, the Code was concerned with ensuring that policies are consistent with sound risk management and do not create excessive risk. The Code applies to all firms regulated under the FSA and was based on general principles that firms must ensure that their remuneration policies are consistent with effective risk management. Ten more specific principles were then developed in connection governance, performance measurement for bonuses and long-term incentive plans and composition. 





A number of the issues that have arisen as a result of the financial crisis have been considered by the House of Commons Treasury Committee. The Treasury Committee examines the expenditure, administration and policy of the Treasury as well as HM Revenue & Customs and other associated public bodies. It is one of the departmental select committees of the House with the powers set out in House of Commons Standing Orders. The Chairman of the Committee during the crisis was the Rt Hon John McFall MP and the principal Clerk Colin Lee. The Treasury Committee had been examined financial stability since early 2007 including, in particular, the Memorandum of Understanding between the Treasury, the Bank of England and the FSA which was revised and reissued on 22 March 2006.​[15]​ 

The Treasury Committee had undertaken an examination of Transparency in Financial Markets and the Structure of UK Plc​[16]​ and decided to examine the issue from a financial stability perspective specifically following the crisis that had occurred with the withdrawal of funds and run on the Northern Rock Plc between 14 and 17 September 2007. A formal report was issued then issued on ‘The Run on the Rock’ on 26 January 2008.​[17]​ This considered the nature and operation of the business model adopted by Northern Rock and its regulation by the FSA, the circumstances surrounding its forced support in August and September and the special position of banks and the need for official support including lender of last resort and deposit protection provision. Principal conclusions and recommendations were made with regard to the regulation of Northern Rock, support operations, bank resolution regimes, deposit protection and supervisory oversight.

The Treasury Committee published a further report on Financial Stability and Transparency on 3 March 2008.​[18]​ The Government issued its Response to the Committee’s Sixth Report on Financial Stability and Transparency in July 2008.​[19]​ The report examines the nature of the changes that have taken place in financial markets since the early 1990s with the ‘great moderation’ or ‘great stability’ and the new financial instruments, including specifically structured finance products, and alternative capital pools that developed in search for higher returns or yield. 

The Treasury Committee issued a report on the extent to which reform was required of the statutory system for the regulation of banks in the UK in September 2008​[20]​ in response to the Tripartite consultation document on Financial Stability in July 2008 with a further Treasury Committee paper in May 2009.​[21]​ The Committee has issued a separate report on the Icelandic Banks and a further report on executive remuneration in the banking area and the extent to which this contributed to the crisis.​[22]​ In its Report on Icelandic banks, the Committee did not accept that there a need to provide assistance to local authorities although it did recommend that, on this occasion only, all charities should be compensated for losses incurred as a consequence of the failures of the Icelandic banks.

(5)	National Audit Office Review





A number of parallel economic and regulatory initiatives were taken forward at the international level by various bodies. The politically strengthened G20 held two major Summits with an initial meeting in Washington in November 2008 under the departing Bush Administration and then a follow-up meeting in London in April 2009 hosted by UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown. The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) has issued a number of papers including its key document on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience in April 2008 and has acted as a central co-ordinating organisation in terms of cross-sector technical and regulatory reform subsequently. Capital adequacy and other bank related corrections have taken forward by the Basel Committee. The Group of 30 (G30) issued a report on Financial Reform and Financial Stability January 2009 and a separate European paper on Financial Supervision in the EU was produced by a High-Level European Group chaired by Jacques de Larosiere which was later adopted by the European Commission in May 2009 as the basis for its institutional reform programme.

(1)	G20 and Bretton Woods II

French and EU President Nicolas Sarkozy and UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown called for a revision of the international financial architecture which led to the G20 ‘Leaders Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy’ held in Washington on 14-15 November 2008. The G20 had been set up after the Asian financial crisis beginning with the collapse of the Thai baht at 2 July 1997 which led to the establishment of a G22 and then G33. This was contracted to a G20 which held its first meeting in Berlin in December 1999.​[24]​ 

The November 2008 meeting was referred to as ‘Bretton Woods II’ as the structure and operation of the international monetary and financial system was to be discussed although it was not expected that the results would be as ambitious as the original Bretton Woods conference held in July 1944 which led, in particular, to the establishment of an international currency system based on the US dollar and to the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the adoption of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which was eventually superseded by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1996. 

The root causes of the crisis were explained in the Communiqué in terms of market participants seeking higher yields without adequate appreciation of the risks involved and the failure to exercise proper due diligence with vulnerabilities being created through weak underwriting standards, unsound risk management practices, increasingly complex and opaque financial products and excessive leverage. Policymakers, regulators and supervisors ‘in some advanced countries’ had not adequately appreciated the risks building up in financial markets, kept pace with financial innovation or taken into account the systemic effects of domestic regulatory action. The crisis was then somewhat over simply explained in terms of yield pursuit and risk management aggravated by product complexity and high leverage. Major underlying factors also included inconsistent and insufficiently co-ordinated macroeconomic policies and inadequate structural reforms that led to unsustainable global macroeconomic conditions. The meaning of underwriting is unclear and there is no reference to false ratings. This may be understood in general descriptive terms or a more specific attack on US deficit spending and Chinese export driven growth.

Existing action was summarised in terms of economic stimulus, liquidity, recapitalisation, deposit protection, regulatory correction, credit market release and international financial institutions support. Further action was still necessary to stabilise markets and support economic growth as economic momentum slowed substantially. It was accordingly agreed that a broader policy response was needed based on closer macroeconomic co-operation to restore growth, avoid negative spillovers and support emerging market economies. Relevant action would include recognising the importance of monetary policy support having regard to domestic conditions and using fiscal measures to stimulate domestic demand at the same time as maintain ‘a policy framework conducive to fiscal sustainability’. Action would be taken to stabilise the financial system where necessary and to provide funding to support the IMF, World Bank and other multilateral development banks to allow them to carry out their crisis roles.

The Declaration contained a separate commitment to an ‘open global economy’ based on free market principles including the rule of law, respect for private property, open trade and investment, competitive markets and efficient and effectively regulated financial systems.  Five common principles for financial market reform were identified based on strengthening transparency and accountability, enhancing sound regulation, promoting integrity in financial markets, reinforcing international co-operation and reforming the international financial institutions. This work would be taken forward by finance ministers with priority actions being completed by end March 2009 in advance of the April 2009 follow-up meeting in London.

The Summit was possibly of more value than many had expected although it was always unclear to what extent the overall objective was more political rather than economic stability directed. Sarkozy was criticised for speaking too long and the Argentinean President for being late for one of the main photo-shoots. The reform principles listed are a mixture of objectives, aspirations and mechanisms. Some useful and necessary recommendations are included such as with regard to securities valuation and rating agencies although many are simply repetitive or too general and simplistic such as with regard to mitigating pro-cyclicality. The general approach adopted is one of delegation with the reform menu simply being passed back to accounting bodies, national regulators, the Basel and other technical committees, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and the IMF and World Bank. Other separate existing agenda are also incorporated such as with regard to uncooperative and non-transparent jurisdictions, money laundering and tax information exchange although these have little direct relevance to financial stability. No technical details are included and no attempt made to deal with more general structural issues such as the massive US current account deficit, undervalued exchange rates, unbalanced export led growth, capital flight, existing trade restrictions, economic cycles and price bubbles and development finance.

The subsequent April G20 meeting represented one of the most important meetings of world leaders in modern history. The agenda was correspondingly expansive and expectations high but qualified. The leaders of 90% of the world’s trading economy had to determine the action to take following the onslaught of the most devastating global recession for 80 years. The dominant ideal was fiscal stimulus in almost all countries and quantitative easing where appropriate. The particular circumstances, needs and financial condition of each country had nevertheless to be taken into account on an individual basis and an appropriate mix of stimulus, easing and fiscal contraction produced. The leaders had also to convince the markets that necessary reforms would be undertaken in the financial regulatory area in each country and globally while any trade protectionism was avoided. International institutions would also be strengthened to assist countries in difficulty. Failure to do so may have turned a recession into a full global depression with growth falling less than the 2.7% predicted by the OECD in 2009 and 4% for the wealthier countries with their output gap between actual and potential performance growing to 8.5% GDP.

Political and media attention focussed on Barak Obama during his first major international event as US President. Even the anti-capitalist objectors looked to Obama for inspiration and leadership. British Prime Minister Brown was embarrassed by Obama’s closeness, courtesy and complimentary support. Sarkozy and Merkel avoided any direct attack while Russian relationships warmed (even though Obama could not pronounce Dmitry Medvedev’s names). A new Sino-American strategic and economic dialogue was also to be established with Obama and Hu Jintao’s support. Sarkozy and Merkel held a separate press conference to confirm their commonality but distance from everyone else and had both stressed that the recession was not caused by their markets with Sarkozy moving from copying London to blaming laissez-faire markets as a broken system. This highlights three different capitalist models with liberal open market US and UK and corporatist Germany and statist France. 

(2)	Financial Stability Forum (FSF)
The most comprehensive set of technical recommendations at the international level were issued by the Financial Stability Forum (FSF). The G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors asked the FSF in October 2007 to undertake an examination of the causes and weaknesses that had produced the turmoil in financial markets and to issue recommendations for increasing resilience of markets and institutions by April 2008. The FSF worked with other international bodies and committees as well as national authorities in the main financial centres to produce its report on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience​[25]​. This draws together the work of many of the other agencies involved​[26]​. The report was presented to the G7 on 11 April 2008 following final discussions at the FSF’s Rome meeting on 28-29 March 2008 on the challenges in financial markets and the action necessary to correct them​[27]​. A further report was issued on implementation in June 2008 and in October 2008.​[28]​ 
(3)	Basel Committee on Banking Supervision	
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision announced its strategy to address fundamental weaknesses following the financial crisis in global markets in November 2008. This was based on eight objectives concerning the strengthening of the risk capture of the Basel II framework (especially for trading book and off-balance sheet exposures), enhancing the quality of tier 1 capital, building additional shock absorbers into the capital framework during stress and to limit pro-cyclicality, leverage review through possible supplementing risk with gross measures in prudential and risk management frameworks, strengthening cross-border liquidity supervision, strengthening risk management and governance practices under Basel II, strengthening counter party credit risk capital, risk management and disclosure at banks and promoting globally co-ordinated supervisory follow-up exercises to ensure implementation of supervisory and industry sound principles. 

The Committee issued a subsequent package of documents to strengthen the Basel II capital framework as part of its review of action necessary to strengthen the regulation and supervision of internationally active banks following the recent crises. The changes specifically relate to trading book exposures (including complex and illiquid credit products), complex securitisations in the banking book (including collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) of asset-backed securities (ABSs)) and off-balance sheet vehicle exposures (including asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits). The supervisory review process was also to be strengthened to ensure more effective supervision and risk management of risk concentrations, off-balance sheet exposures, securitisations and related reputation risks with other improvements to valuations, the management of funding liquidity risks and firm-wide stress testing practices. There would be enhanced disclosure of securitisations and the sponsorship of off-balance sheet vehicles. Trading book changes would come into effect by December 2010 with the other revisions by end-2009. 

The Basel Committee separately confirmed in March 2009 that its membership would be extended to include representatives from Australia, Brazil, China, India, Korea, Mexico and Russia which took the total number of members to 20. This was considered necessary to enhance the Committee’s ability to carry out its core mission in strengthening regulatory practices and standards worldwide and followed the G20 call by major standard second bodies to review their current memberships.
The Basel Committee has issued a paper on ‘Range of practices and issues in economic capital frameworks’ (March 2009). Economic capital relates to the methods of practices allowing banks to assess risk and attribute capital consistently to cover the economic effects of risk-taking activities. 
 
(4)	G30 Financial Reform Report

The Group of 30 (G30) issued a report on Financial Reform – A Framework for Financial Stability (January 2009). A steering committee had been set up in July 2009 under Paul Volker with Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa and Arminio Fraga Meto as vice chairmen. The report considers the policy issues relating to redefining the scope and boundaries of prudential regulation, reforming the structure of regulation (including the role of central banks and market support arrangements), improving governance, risk management, regulatory policy and accounting practices and standards as well as securing improvements in transparency and financial infrastructure arrangements. The report provides an overview programme for reform and contains 18 specific recommendations on the scope of prudential regulation, structure of regulation and international co-ordination, governance standards and transparency and incentives. 
(5)	EU Financial Supervision Group
 
An EU group chaired by Jacques de Larosiere published its report on The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU in February 2009. The purpose of the report is to establish a framework for the construction of a new EU regulatory agenda, stronger co-ordinated supervision and effective crisis management procedures. The report examines the cause of the financial crisis and develops recommendations for policy and regulatory repair, EU supervisory repair and global repair. The de Larosiere Group explains the crisis in terms of substantial balance sheet expansion and leverage following high levels of macroeconomic liquidity and low interest rate and yields, inadequate risk management, defective credit ratings, corporate governance failures and regulatory, supervisory and crisis management failure (paras.(6)-(13)). The dynamics of the crisis are also reviewed (paras.32-37). Regulation and supervision are distinguished in terms of control and oversight (para.38) with reference being made to the parallel G30 report on Financial Reform (para.30). 













A number of more specific regulatory revisions should be considered in developing any meaningful emerging post-crisis reform. 
 
(a)	Regulatory Gap and Omission













It is inevitable that capital adequacy standards will be further revised following the crises. This was nevertheless a liquidity rather than capital crisis with capital only becoming relevant with the subsequent collapse of share prices on stock markets. This was again then principally concerned with business models and leverage rather than underlying capital with massive capital injections being required to prevent further falls far in excess of that prescribed under regulatory rules. The Basel sub-committees are already working on a series of ‘Basel III’ revisions, the general effect of which was to allow banks to rely increasingly on internal measurement systems and to align more closely regulatory and economic capital. This will now include strengthening various aspects of the Basel II regime including securitisation and credit risk mitigation allowances such as with credit default swaps (CDSs). These more technical reforms will now be reassessed in light of recent events but will be of limited effect of themselves.

A number of commentators have, in particular, pressed for the adoption of counter-cyclical capital charging. This would require banks to raise additional capital during economic growth periods that could be used to contain losses in a downturn. This was supported by the Turner Review. Difficulties nevertheless arise with regard to the complexity of such a proposal and with the number of distinct models and metrics that can be used. These may also either operate on a formulaic or discretionary basis with discretionary systems inevitably leading abuse and formulaic systems to inconsistency. In either case, the new charges may be expensive to administer and impose additional unnecessary costs on banks. 

It may also prove to be impossible to reach any clear agreement on the most desirable relevant standard at the European and global levels. Countries would then be at a significant competitive disadvantage if they attempted to introduce counter-cyclical charging on their own at the national level. More generally, this is counter-intuitive and anti-normal market processes. This may only delay recovery and subsequently interfere with normal market operations. Equivalent effects can be secured through simply strengthening tier 1 and, in particular, common equity capital positions as many of the largest banks have already achieved. There is also the more difficult policy issue to be resolved of whether regulatory charges should be used to secure separate more general monetary objectives. Opinion differs and debate continues on this point.

It is clearly necessary to strengthen core tier 1 capital and especially in equity. Regulatory authorities already have necessary discretion under the Basel II provisions and under national regulation. The earlier 8% minimum under Basel I was only set as an absolute floor figure with many countries including the UK maintaining average ratios of between 12-14% or above in higher risk situations. This can most easily be strengthened by setting new core tier 1 limits at either 4% or 6% which would, in turn, take average total capital to up to 15% or 16%. National regulators would have to set and give effect to the relevant limits in each case. Once markets recover, it is possible that a 4% core tier 1 (common equity) requirement would be more than sufficient which would avoid the need for additional and over complex counter-cyclical charging.

It must also be stressed that the size of the losses suffered on structured finance products (distressed assets) was so severe in the case of the recent financial crisis that no amount of adjusted minimum capital would have been sufficient. Authorities must further ensure that they have effective extended support arrangements in place including appropriate capital support facilities (CFSs) where necessary (below). The authorities will always have to support the banking markets in light of the importance of the functions that they carry out and inherent instability. This cannot be ignored or forgotten in determining any new capital minima. 

(e)	Leverage Ratio Ceilings 
One major deficiency revealed by the crisis was the high level of leverage operated by many investment firms and banks. Regulators should consider the reintroduction of more basic financial ratios including debt/capital (leverage) limits to act as supplementary guidelines in assessing risk management and capital adequacy. It may be considered inappropriate to impose specific numeric values due to the inflexible and arbitrary effects these may have. Basic ratios may nevertheless be used to reassess the value of the revised capital rules to be brought into effect under Basel II and Basel III and the effectiveness of underlying risk management systems. 
 
(f)	 ‘Systemic or Crisis’ Reserves 









Governance and accountability arrangements must be strengthened within financial institutions.  Many regulators are also reconsidering executive pay packages and their effect on business strategies and risk escalation. One of the effects of the US$1m limit on cash payments in the US was to create an industry designing alternative reward systems based on share options and other stock devices. 

Care must nevertheless be exercised in this area with reward systems being left to market forces insofar as possible. The downturn in the market has already had a significant effect and the UK FSA is looking at risk distortion effects.  One possible area of abuse requiring more direct intervention is ‘golden parachutes’ with regulators being given power to re-open contracts where legitimate regulatory concerns have arisen.

Regulators will also have to consider the stability effects of share buy-back schemes specifically with substantial amounts of profit in financial institutions having been diverted to fund such purchases. Any risk generating or risk distorting effects must be eliminated. Guidelines may also be issued in connection with dividend payments to ensure that dividend policies do not distort risk incentives and that adequate reserves are retained in all cases.

(i)	Complex Product Design  

































A full range of support tools must be available in the event of a major crisis arising with as much flexibility as possible being provided. This should include being able to conduct ‘systemic inspections’ and issue ‘systemic directions’ based on the earlier ‘systemic returns’ referred to. A full range of bank transfer options (BTOs) must be available including private transfers, regulatory (‘bridge bank’) transfers and public transfers (nationalisation). A special bank administration procedure (BAP), bank insolvency procedure (BIP) and enhanced deposit protection procedure (DPT) must all be in place. Many of these facilities were already available in the UK although the Government has assisted by clarifying them under the provisions contained in the Banking Bill which includes the new bank ‘Special Resolution Regime’ (SRR).

A range of special support facilities (SSFs) should also be set up for use in extreme cases. These could include a ‘Liquidity Support Facility’ (LSF), ‘Capital Support Facility’ (CSF), ‘Guarantee Support Facility’ (GSF), ‘Asset Purchase Facility’ (APF) and a ‘Direct Credit Facility’ (DCF). These would be used to inject liquidity into the inter-bank markets, recapitalise banks, support wholesale lending, purchase distressed (toxic) assets and provide direct credit facilities to banks for passing on to corporate or individual customers where no other sources of funding are available. Appropriate institutional arrangements will also have to be set up to hold government interests for a temporary period as with UK Financial Investments Limited (UKFI). The effect of these arrangements should be to allow banks to operate effectively even in extreme conditions although the extent to which they will be able to continue to make new funds available will depend on the terms set and amount of credit made available by the government.   

A number of other special corrective mechanisms should also be considered. These include confirming that central bank support can be provided on a non-disclosed basis (following the difficulties at Northern Rock) as well as possibly suspending mark-to-market valuation rules where these provide no useful purpose and only aggravate individual bank crisis. Further corrective devices could include bans on ‘naked’ short selling of financial stock or full bans on short selling in times of stress as well as share trading suspensions in particular cases for temporary periods.

(5)	International and Institutional Revision

A series of further international and institutional amendments should be considered as part of the new ‘international financial architecture’ announced at the Bretton Woods I summit although these may take longer to put into place. This would include co-ordinating cross-border crisis management and deposit protection arrangements. A ‘Global Financial Rulebook’ (GFR) should be created based on the Financial Stability Forum’s existing ‘Compendium of Standards’ which currently operates on a ‘virtual’ basis by collecting the main papers from each of the principal international financial institutions, standards bodies and technical committees. This must include a new ‘Global Crisis Management’ rulebook or section to clarify cross-border support arrangements. 

A global ‘Financial Stability Facility’ (FStF) has to be set up managed by the IMF to provide support to countries in need of assistance for domestic crisis management purposes with funds principally be made available through special lending facilities agreed with countries with substantial foreign exchange reserves such as in the Middle East and China. Appropriate institutional or other diplomatic concessions would have to be made in return inc including amending the composition and voting rights on the IMF, World Bank and other international financial institution boards. 







We are at the beginning of a new financial world. This does not represent the rejection or demolition of the old one but only that a new more streamlined and rebalanced financial marketplace has been created. Cheaper credit conditions will return although not in the same volumes as before with a substantial deleveraging of positions having to take place. Considerably higher degrees of transparency and disclosure will be introduced including over off-balance sheet assets. The role and function of credit rating agencies and accuracy and validity of their grading processes will be reassessed. The economic and regulatory value of credit protection including the use of credit defaults swaps will be recalibrated.

The global economy is essentially market and financial market based. This has allowed significant welfare benefits and individual and social wealth gain. Significant difficulties can nevertheless arise where core banking services are mixed with more volatile securities markets and stock market trading. Originate-to-distribute models have not been wholly discredited nor has the larger process of securitisation of debt been undermined. Bank and security based credit will continue to be offered together with banking and capital markets working in parallel. The authorities must nevertheless reassess the effects of this relationship to ensure that an effective balance is maintained at all times. A similar dilemma arose in the 1930s which has now to be reconsidered and re-resolved having regard to modern markets and credit conditions. The ultimate objective remains one of protecting confidence in the safe and stable operation of the financial system. This should be possible provided that the new post-crisis global marketplace operates on a clear and transparent basis with excess being removed and with more complex innovative forms of financing being kept within reasonable limits having regard to their potential systemic effects. Revised and extended market support operations must also be installed and made available at all times. 

The crisis has resulted in substantial loss and damage across national economies and across the globe. Any arguments with regard to predictability or natural cycles are of no assistance to those suffering consequent hardship. The correction was nevertheless necessary to restore many asset and commodity prices to more proportionate levels. The crisis has also provided the opportunity of redesigning a new national and international infrastructure for market supervision and regulation. A number of the initiatives announced at the G20 Communiqués are of value and should be taken forward. National authorities must also adopt all necessary reforms to prevent such extreme crisis and damage in future. In so doing, authorities must remember that this was a full financial and financial system crisis and not simply not one limited to the banking sector. All necessary lessons on a cross-sector, cross-border and cross-disciplinary nature must be learned.

The financial world almost collapsed but was salvaged at the last instance. It should still be possible to realise the benefits of modern finance and credit supply at the same time as manage and limit the underlying risks and exposures created. The challenge of the post-crisis world is to create a new more balanced and effective managed market system. Blind unregulated financial capitalism driven by individual greed and profit without corresponding responsibility and accountability is hopefully over. Innovative and dynamic financial markets and services must nevertheless be preserved and extended to support national and global trade and relations and longer term economic growth and social development. It remains to be seen whether all of the necessary steps will be taken this time.

Professor George Walker,
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